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ABSTRACT
With the advent of advanced, highly automated cockpits that are found in
modern jet transport category aircraft, most of the tedious work of flying the
aircraft solely by reference to raw data information from the airplane’s
instruments is becoming a thing of the past. Pilots are no longer required to use
their basic instrument skills on a daily basis and as a result, their basic
instrument flying skills may diminish over time due to lack of use.
The purpose of this study was to gain an assessment of professional
pilots’ basic instrument skills. The study used both qualitative and quantitative
measures to accomplish this task.
The hypothesis for this study was that with the advent of advanced
aircraft, a pilot’s basic instrument flying skills will diminish over time, and will no
longer be at the level required when they received their ATP license. The two
research questions were to what extent degradation in basic instrument pilot
skills occurs, and can this degradation be statistically proven?
The study used two groups of pilots (wide-body and narrow body) flying
five basic instrument maneuvers. The maneuvers were flown without the use of
any automation. Each maneuver was flown 30 times. Statistical analysis was
conducted on the pilots groups looking for significant differences between
groups.
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In addition to the quantitative portion of the study, the pilots were surveyed
to gauge their individual perceptions of their instrument skill level. The survey
results were compared and correlated to the data from the maneuvers flown by
the pilots.
When analyzed, using a t-test, all of the maneuvers showed a significant
degradation below what is required for Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certification.
In each case the mean maneuver grade was close to the basic instrument
certification standard as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
There was no statistical significance between different groups of pilots that
participated in the study.
The survey portion of the study revealed that most professional pilots
agree that their basic instrument skills have declined over time. However the
pilots in the study also believed that they could still fly the airplane by reference
to raw data with a high degree of skill. Maneuver grades and survey responses
indicate that the pilots overestimated their basic instrument skills.
This study did not seek to investigate professional pilot’s overall flying
skills which remain both safe and highly competent. It only intended to
investigate a small segment of overall piloting skills. By increasing a pilot’s basic
instrument skills, overall flying skills can be enhanced as well as the ability to
cope with instrumentation failures that degrade the fidelity of the modern glass
aircraft. The problem of decreased instrument skills will continue into the future
as more older-generation aircraft are retired. Additional training and practice
should be sufficient to retain these skills.
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CHAPTER 1
DEDRADATON OF PILOTING SKILLS
Introduction
With the advent of advanced, highly-automated cockpits found in modern
jet transport category aircraft, most of the tedious work of flying the aircraft solely
by reference to raw data information from the airplane’s instruments is becoming
a thing of the past. In fact, many of the airlines now suggest that pilots not hand
fly the aircraft with the automation turned off (United, 2006). In years past, with
older style aircraft, commercial pilots were required to do a majority of instrument
flying by reference to raw data instrumentation. Although flight directors were
installed on these aircraft, they were seldom used and often unreliable. The net
result of this type of flying produced highly competent instrument pilots. With the
increased use of automation, basic instrument skills flight may be declining. It is
the purpose of this study to determine if the average jet transport pilot’s basic
instrument flying skills have diminished as a function of the time spent flying
technologically advanced aircraft. Research on adult literacy skills does show a
decline over periods of non-use (Wagner, 1995).
Problem
The piloting style of highly automated jet transport category aircraft may
cause a commercial airline pilots’ basic instrument flying skills to diminish over

1

time. In fact, a recent research study asked pilots to evaluate their own
instrument skills (Advanced Aircraft Technology Safety Survey Report, 1998). A
majority of pilots responded that they believed their skills have diminished. In the
survey 85% of respondents stated that they preferred to hand-fly part of every
trip to retain their pilots skills. In addition, 43% pilots considered that their
manual flying skills had declined since they started flying advanced technology
aircraft. Most major airlines encourage the use of automation thus adding to the
problem of possible skill degradation (United Airlines, 2006).
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to gain professional pilots’ self assessment
of their basic instrument flying skills. In addition, the study attempted to quantify
if a statistically significant degradation of a professional pilot’s instrument flying
skills occurs over time while flying highly automated aircraft.
Significance
Certain failures in highly automated aircraft can cause complete loss of
the auto-throttles, flight director, and moving map display, thus forcing the pilots
to revert to their basic instrument flying skills. If a significant decline in basic
instrument flying skills is observed as a function of time spent flying
technologically advanced aircraft, then a potential safety risk exists. If any
degradation of skills can be empirically documented and proven, then the airlines
can use this study to develop specific training programs and guidelines to
improve basic instrument flying skills. In addition, guidance can be derived and
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given to professional flight crews on how to maintain their instrument skills during
regular line operations.
Hypothesis
With the advent of advanced aircraft with modern auto-throttles, flight
director, and FMC/map, a pilot’s basic instrument flying skills will diminish over
time and will no longer be at the level required when they received their ATP
license. The null hypothesis is that even after flying advanced aircraft,
professional pilots still met the minimum skills as defined by the FAA to pass an
ATP check.
Research Questions
1. Do basic instrument piloting skills decline in pilots of advanced modern jet
transport aircraft?
2. If basic instrument piloting skills decline in pilots of advanced modern jet
transport aircraft, then does the decline depend upon time spent flying
technologically advanced aircraft?
3. Does a professional pilot’s perception of their instrument skills reflect their
actual skill level?
4. Can this degradation be statistically proven by comparing these pilots
against the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) standard for
professional pilots (Airline Transport Pilot – ATP – standard).
Framework
This study was a mixed methodology study focusing on two aspects of
basic instrument flying. First a qualitative survey was given to pilots to gauge
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their perception of their own instrument skills. The second part of the study
required the use of first look data (data from maneuvers flown without prebriefing or practice) from participating airlines and was quantitative in nature.
Each pilot of the flight crew flew five basic instrument maneuvers (in the
simulator) without any prior practice or briefing. The captain and first officer each
started with a different maneuver (starting maneuver was based on the day of the
week). The maneuvers were evaluated in accordance with standard airline
industry grading criteria and were represented as a numerical rating. The data
was completely de-identified and the maneuvers were non-jeopardy to the flight
crew. The independent variable for the quantitative part of the study was the
type of aircraft that pilots were flying, and the dependent variable was their basic
instrument skill level. Each maneuver was flown 30 times by each of the
following categories of pilots:
a. Pilots of long-haul wide-body aircraft (B777, B747-400 A330, A340).
b. Pilot of narrow-body short haul aircraft (B737-300, A320, B757)
The two pilot groups were each chosen due to the fact that they should
show significantly different results. Narrow body pilots have a greater frequency
of takeoffs and landings than those of wide-body aircraft. This frequency may
add to a pilot flying proficiency. In addition, most wide-body aircraft rely heavily
on automation due to the long duration of their flights. The study took both type
of aircraft and frequency of flying into account.
There were 30 total pilots from a variety of backgrounds in the study. The
number of pilots was chosen in order to gain a statistically significant sample
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approximating the skill level of the general professional pilot population. Each
pilot group was compared using an independent samples t-test against the FAA
proficiency standard with specific emphasis placed on the comparison between
narrow-body and wide-body aircraft. This was done in an attempt to prove that
there is a statistical difference between these pilots. Post hoc tests were
performed on the different maneuvers sets to determine if the complexity of the
maneuver affected the pilot’s ability to successfully fly them. If the study
hypothesis is correct the pilots of the modern aircraft should show a significant
statistical difference as compared to the standard pilot performance as defined
by the FAA. A summary of perceived instrument skills in each category was
compared to the actual first look data results to see if there was any correlation
between perceived piloting skills and actual performance.
Assumptions
1. Each participant was a qualified FAR pt 121 jet transport pilot employed
by a US carrier (passenger or cargo).
2. Each participant has spent at least one year in the specific seat and type
of aircraft. It is assumed that after one year of experience on a particular
aircraft, that the pilot will be both comfortable and accustomed to flying
that particular aircraft (the aircraft will not be “new” to them).
3. Each pilot was current and qualified in the respective aircraft.
4. Each pilot was considered a line pilot.
5. The pilots had no prior knowledge or practice of the maneuver that was
flown and was given no opportunity to practice it beforehand.
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6. Each pilot was assumed to fly to the best of their ability during the
maneuver.
7. Each Check Airman rated the maneuvers on a consistent basis after
receiving specific rater reliability training.
Limits
1. The study could be subject to inter-rater reliability errors of the individual
instructors who evaluated the maneuvers.
2. The study did account for pilots who fly additional aircraft outside of their
respective company which in many cases would be traditional style
aircraft. The study asked in the survey if the pilot is flying outside of
his/her professional employment.
3. This study was not designed to specify what, if any, additional training
would be required to maintain these instrument flying skills (that will be a
follow on study). The study recorded how long it has been since a pilot
has flown in a professional capacity using “raw data”, and this in turn may
lead to some insight as to how long these skills remain active.
4. The study tested only five maneuvers to determine the level of piloting
skills and is only representative of a pilot’s basic instrument skills, and not
their overall piloting skills.
5. This study is applicable to jet transport pilots of US carriers only.
6. The study does not account for the fact that most of the pilots of widebody
glass aircraft spent many years flying traditional aircraft, and conversely
the junior first officers of narrow body aircraft may have mainly flown
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advanced aircraft. Some studies do indicate that skills learned and
extensively practiced will be maintained and recalled at a higher rate than
those skills briefly learned and utilized. (Argote, 1998).
Literature Review
A literature review was conducted of pertinent articles related to this study.
Although there were no direct articles on this particular problem, there were
many articles concerning professional flight crews and automation. The review
begins with a broad overview of learning theory especially related to skill
acquisition, retention, and declination. In addition to reviewing only automation
related issues, skill retention issues in the other fields were reviewed. Finally, an
anecdotal study on the reliance on GPS was reviewed to add some additional
perspective to the problem of negative learning transfer with related system
reliance problems. The automation articles were from a wide range of
government and private bodies that are considered experts in the field of
automation.
Learning a Complex Skill
In the study, Knowledge Structures and the Acquisition of a Complex Skill,
the researchers examined the viability of knowledge structures as an
operationalization of learning in the context of a task that required a high degree
of skill (Day, 2001). During a period of three days, 86 men participated in nine
training sessions on learning to play a complex video game. After a four day
non-practice period, the participants completed tests of skill retention and skill
transfer. The findings of the study indicated that the similarity of trainees’
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knowledge structures to an expert structure correlated with skill acquisition and
was predictive of skill retention and skill transfer (Day, 2001). In addition,
knowledge structures mediated the relationship between general cognitive ability
and skill based performance.
Knowledge structures are based on the premise that people organize
information into patterns that reflect the relationships that exist between concepts
and the features that define them (Johnson-Laird, 1983). These structures
represent the organization of knowledge. Declarative knowledge reflects the
amount of knowledge or facts that are learned. Memory organization enables
individuals with a means for organizing and retrieving information for long term
storage. The study used a technique called structural assessment (SA) to
measure knowledge structures (Johnson-Laird, 1983). In a training context,
knowledge structures reflect the degree to which trainees have organized and
comprehended the content of training. SA can be used to identify knowledge
structures that differentiate between experts and novices.
The study (Knowledge Structures) expected to find that the accuracy of
trainees’ knowledge structures to have a positive correlation with skill acquisition,
retention, and transfer (Day, 2001). As individuals gain knowledge of a concept
or task, their knowledge structures converge toward a true representation of that
task. The researchers in the study assumed that an expert’s organization and
comprehension of a domain of knowledge are a close approximation of the true
representation of that domain, and that this expert structure can be considered
an indicator of skill development.
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The results of the study showed that trainees whose knowledge structures
were more similar to an expert structure performed substantially better on
mastering the video game. General cognitive ability was correlated with the
accuracy of trainees’ knowledge structures, and had a strong relationship with a
mechanically combined referent structure (CM) (expert memory organization).
CM was related to skill acquisition. The structure of the highly skilled trainee
reflected functional similarities (to an expert), whereas the structure of the poorly
skilled trainee reflected superficial similarities (Day, 2001). Finally, the study
found that trainees with a higher cognitive ability have knowledge structures that
are more similar to an expert in nature (Day, 2001).
Learning Degradation
Argote (1990) examined the persistence and transfer of learning using
production rates and transfer of knowledge of producing Liberty War ships
(during World War II). During a review of the most prevalent research, the study
found that little evidence about the extent to which learning persists (Argote,
1990). The study also concurred with the fact that the time required to perform a
task declined at a decreasing rate as experience with the task increased.
However, previous studies also found that if practicing of a task was interrupted;
forgetting occurs (Ebbinghaus 1885). While interference from other tasks causes
forgetting, forgetting occurs when performance is delayed even if there is no
interference (Anderson 1985). When performance is resumed, it is typically
inferior to when it was interrupted (Kolers, 1976). The study found that the
“conventional measure of learning, cumulative output, significantly overstates the
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persistence of learning” (Argote, 1990 page 145). Results from the study
indicated a rapid rate of learning depreciation, in some cases as much as 97%
over a one year period. It must be noted that all data for the study was gathered
from shipyards in the 1940s.
The opportunity for pilots to practice and maintain their skills has
decreased significantly over time (Advanced Aircraft Technology Safety Survey
Report, 1998). Airline polices, advanced automation, and increased long haul
flying has all added to this decreased opportunity to manually fly the airplane. To
combat this problem, some airlines have added simulator sessions to allow pilots
to practice hand flying skills. A recent survey of pilot perceptions indicated that
85% of respondents prefer to hand-fly part of every trip to retain their skills. A
statistically significant difference was noted between the responses of captains
and first officers, with first officers more likely to prefer to “hand-fly part of every
trip than captains.” (Advanced Aircraft Technology Safety Survey Report, 1998,
page 28). “Forty-three per cent of pilots considered that their manual flying skills
had declined since they started flying advanced technology aircraft.” (Advanced
Aircraft Technology Safety Survey Report, 1998, page 29). Most pilots hand-fly
their aircraft at some stages of each flight to maintain an acceptable skill level.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the main reasons for this are a pilot’s natural
satisfaction in performing manual flying tasks, the requirement to perform manual
flying exercises during simulator sessions (including recurrent training and
license renewal) and the need to be able to manually fly the aircraft should the
automated systems fail to function as expected.
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It would appear that the attempts of both the pilots and their airlines have
not succeeded in maintaining a perceived level of manual skills. Of concern are
pilots who continue to manually control an aircraft with a diminishing level of skill.
This has been recognized by some airlines who have implemented
supplementary simulator programs to compensate for a perceived loss of manual
flying skills. Some airlines have required pilots to demonstrate their manual
flying skills during simulator exercises to fulfill the requirements set down by
regulatory authorities (Advanced Aircraft technology Safety Survey Report,
1998). These requirements (for example, manually flown instrument approaches
or emergency descents) are often outdated and thus not appropriate for the
current level of technology. Further research is needed to determine how pilots
can best maintain their manual flying skills, the reliability of autopilot systems,
and the appropriateness of license renewal procedures. The Bureau of Air
Safety Investigation recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(Australia) ensure that all recurrent and rating renewal simulator exercises are
appropriate considering the level of automation fitted to the aircraft type. Such
exercises should reflect the level of serviceability which the pilot may be
expected to encounter during line operations. (Advanced Aircraft Technology
Safety Survey Report, 1998)
Stefanidis (2006) examined the proficiency of highly complex skills over a
period of time if those skills are not used. Specifically, the study found that
laparoroscopic surgery skills declined by 40% in residents after 15 months of
non-use. The study developed a hypothesis that a complex laparoscopic skill
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(suturing) acquired by novices using a proficiency-based curriculum would be
better maintained with ongoing training compared with a control group. The
study’s specific aims were also to measure long term retention by novice learners
and to identify the time interval at which skill deterioration initially becomes
detectable, so that maintenance training interventions can be appropriately timed
during future curricula (Stefanidis, 2006). To assess retention, both groups
performed three repetitions of laparoscopic suturing at 2 weeks and at 1, 3, and 6
months post training completion without any instruction. The ongoing training
group continued training after the first three repetitions at each follow up interval
(starting at the first month) until the proficiency level was achieved on two
consecutive plus five additional attempts. The study found that both groups had
excellent retention at the six month period, but the ongoing training group
retained a greater portion of their skill. Maintenance training reduced the skill
loss to that of half of the control group. At 15 months, a similar group of
surgeons demonstrated a 40% skill loss in spite of on the job training
(unpublished data). The study went on to state that notable differences between
the groups were detected and that ongoing training enhances skill retention.
Finally, the study found that despite excellent initial training, in the absence of
routine clinical use, complex skills diminish.
Another study on adult literacy skills titled Use it or Lose it, The Problem of
Adult Literacy Skill Retention, published by the National Center for Adult Literacy,
reported several key findings as they relate to skills retention. The study found
that adult literacy skill retention varied dramatically from adult to adult depending
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on the individual learner, prior knowledge of the skill, and the type and duration of
instruction (Wagner, 1995). It also found that extensive retraining of a skill is
necessary after regular practice of that skill ceased (Wagner, 1995).
Automation Training
The Flight Safety Foundation published an article focusing on pilots
transitioning to glass airplanes. In the article, the author (Wiener, 1999) made
many recommendations on how to successfully train pilots on the operation of
advanced aircraft. He suggested that there must only be one standard, and it
must be taught and checked constantly. He also recommended that flight
management should formulate a policy on maintaining manual flying (hand flying)
skills and convey this to the pilots (Wiener, 1999). He also suggested that
companies allow for the practice of non-automation-based problem solving skills.
A similar study commissioned by the FAA reported similar findings.
As a result of a crash of an Airbus A300 in Nagoya Japan, the FAA
chartered a human factors (HF) team to address automaton related issues. They
were concerned that incidents and accidents such as what happed in Nagoya
appeared to highlight difficulties in flight crews interacting with increasing flight
deck automation. The HF team determined from its findings that vulnerabilities in
flight crew management of automation and situation awareness exist. Among
their findings were the pilots understanding of the automations’ capabilities,
limitations, modes, and operating principles and techniques (Abbott, 1992). The
team also found differing pilot decisions about whether to turn the automation on
or off during non-normal situations. In addition, the HF team made a specific
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recommendation to the FAA, that it should require operators’ manuals and
training programs to provide clear guidance on circumstances in which the
autopilot should be engaged, disengaged, or used in a mode with greater or
lesser authority.
Automation and Communication / Decision Making
In the study Impact of Automation of Aircrew Communication and
Decision-Making Performance, the researchers’ attempted to clarify the
relationship between automation, crew communication, and effective decision
making. The study involved 48 pilots flying predetermined simulator missions in
either automated or manual conditions. The scenario was designed to require
crewmembers to arrive at a collective decision based on information obtained
about an evolving simulated disaster. The study found that the introduction of
automation was not associated with better performance (Bowers, 1995). There
were however, significant differences in the communications of crews flying in the
automated versus manual conditions. Harmful consequences as a result of
automation have been hypothesized that include increased complacency and
decreased vigilance (Wiener, 1987) Results from the study indicated that
communication rates measured in spoken works tended to decrease as the level
of automation increased even though activity rates of piloting duties and problem
solving remained equally high. The introduction of automation did not appear to
result in improved crew performance. In fact, the data suggested a mild
advantage for crews in traditional cockpits (Bowers, 1995). Further data
suggested that automation resulted in a slight reduction in workload; however,
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this reduction was not associated with improved flight performance. The crews in
the automated flight condition displayed worse performance on a decisionmaking task (Bowers, 1995). This study along with others on this topic indicates
that a consequence of automation is the redistribution of workload and alteration
of the crew process.
Automation Bias
A study titled Automation Bias: Decision Making and Performance in
High-Tech Cockpits sought to quantify the effects of automation over-reliance in
modern cockpits. This study pointed out the need for pilots to be able to fly the
airplane when the automation does not function correctly. Automated aid and
decision support tools are becoming the norm in today’s’ modern jet aircraft.
Automation is assuming increasing control of cognitive flights tasks, such as
calculating fuel-efficient routes, navigating, or detecting and diagnosing system
malfunctions and abnormalities (Mosier, 1998). The term automation bias refers
to omission and commission errors resulting from the use of automated cues as
a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing (Mosier,
1998). Highly automated cockpits tend to change the way pilots perform tasks
and make decisions. Researchers have documented problems in the use of
advanced automated systems, including mode misunderstanding, failures to
understand automated behavior, confusion or lack of awareness concerning what
automated systems are doing and why, and difficulty tracing the functioning or
reasoning process of automated agent (Billings, 1996; Sarter and Woods,
1993).
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In traditional aircraft, crewmembers are trained and develop their skills
assessment through the use of both system and environmental cues (cross
checking of information). In most situations, processing is facilitated by intercorrelations among cues (Wickerns and Flach, 1998). In the cross checking
environment, which related to older technology aircraft, pilots often looked for
many clues in determining if a problem existed. Pilots know and look for patterns
or combination of cues that are most ecologically valid, reliable, or relevant for
diagnosing particular situations, and they are able to incorporate contextual
information to formulate a workable action plan based on their assessment of
these cues (Kaempf and Klein, 1994).
When automated aids are introduced, the pattern of cue utilization is
disrupted. Automated aids present powerful and usually highly accurate cues. In
fact, computational system diagnostic capabilities are advertised as being more
accurate than pilots. This leads to the overall attitude that the automated cues
are not just another cue, but the most powerful and important cue. These
automated decision aids feeds into the general human tendency to travel the
road of least cognitive effort. Typically people try to engage in the least amount
of cognitive work they can get away with (Fiske and Taylor, 1994). People will
generally utilize heuristics (cognitive shortcuts) to reduce effort and information
load.
It must be noted that automation does greatly aid in high-tech
environments. These systems are designed to decrease pilot workload by
performing many cognitive tasks. However indiscriminate use may have the
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effect of increasing errors. Inappropriate usage of automation in decision making
may result in automation bias.
The study described two types of automation errors; omission errors and
commission errors. Automation omission errors result when decision makers do
not take appropriate action because they are not informed of an imminent
problem or situation by automated aids (Moiser, 1998).
China Airlines B747-SP, flying at 41,000 ft., lost power in its #4
engine. The autopilot, which was set for pitch guidance and altitude
hold, attempted to correct for the loss by holding the left wing down,
masking the approaching loss of control of the airplane. The crew
did not realize that there was a problem with the engine and took
no action to deal with it. When the captain disengaged the autopilot,
the airplane rolled to the right, yawed, then entered a steep descent
in clouds. Extensive damage occurred during descent and recovery
(NTSB Report AAR-86-03, in Billings, 1996).

In a non-random sample of 166 events, the study found that the most
likely phase of flight for omission errors to occur was the cruise phase.
Automation commission errors are errors made when decision makers
inappropriately follow automated information or directives (when other
information in the environment contradicts or is inconsistent with the automated
cue) (Moiser, 1998,).
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Experimental evidence of automation-induced commission errors
was provided by a full-mission simulation in the NASA Ames
Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS; Mosier, Palmer, &
Degani, 1992). During takeoff, crews received contradictory fire
indications. An auto-sensing electronic checklist suggested that the
crew shut down the #1 engine, which was supposedly on fire.

Traditional engine parameters indicated that the #1 engine was
recovering and that the #2 engine was actually more severely
damaged. Seventy-five percent of the crews in the auto-sensing
condition incorrectly shut down the #1 engine, whereas only 25%
with the traditional paper checklist did likewise (Moiser, 1998).

The use of automated cues as a shortcut in decision making may result in
omission or commission errors. Participants in this study were 25 commercial
glass-cockpit pilots (i.e., pilots of automated aircraft, including Boeing 737300,757,747,747-400, MD-11). The average age of the pilots was 47, mean total
flight experience was 12,370 hr, and the average career flying time was 23 years
(Moiser, 1998).
The participants were divided into two groups and given profiles to fly and
their errors were recorded. Descriptive analysis of the results of the study
revealed overall omission rates for flight-related events of approximately 55%.
The results of the study found that automation bias is a significant factor in pilot
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interaction with automated aids. The study also found that most pilots are not
utilizing all of their available information when performing tasks and making
decisions. Experience and expertise, which might be predicted to make pilots
more vigilant and less susceptible to automation bias, are related to a greater
tendency to use only automated cues (Moiser, 1998)
Automation Over Reliance
The final portion of this literature review compares an anecdotal study of
GPS usage vs. traditional navigation. A study in 2005 by Casner demonstrated
that pilots who navigate solely with a GPS and moving map displays have
significantly less situational awareness than those pilots flying with a traditional
map. It was hypothesized that this drop in navigational awareness was due to
the passive role assumed by pilots when using equipment that automates the
navigational task.
In the first study two groups of pilots were given the task to navigate over
three predetermined points. Pilot group one used only a current aviation map
(sectional chart), whereas group 2 used only a GPS with a moving map display.
Both pilot groups were again asked to navigate over the same circuit without the
use of any navigational aids. The results were measured in deviation from the
circuit points in nautical miles. Pilot group two performed significantly (P<.05)
worse than pilot group one (Casner, 2005). In fact two pilots in the GPS group
could not even find their way to the starting point of the circuit. The study then
sought to find a way to keep pilots using GPS more aware of their surroundings.
A third group of pilots was tasked to fly the same circuit as the first two groups.
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Group three was permitted to use a GPS/moving map, however they were
instructed to point out geological features along the circuit. The study used the
hypothesis of deep vs. shallow processing in hopes that pilot group 3 would
perform better than pilot group 2 while flying the circuit a second time. “In fact,
performance of pilot group 3 was significantly better than group 2 during the
second circuit (1.53 mean deviation vs. 4.92).” (Casner, 2005 page 8). The
study concluded that the more pilot is active in a navigation task, the greater their
navigational awareness.
This literature review sought to give a broad overview of the related issues
involving professional pilot instrument skill degradation. The review touched on
learning and retention theory as well as automation related issues. It also
discussed similar issues in related fields.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Introduction
With the widespread use of highly automated jet aircraft, will a
professional pilot’s basic instrument skills deteriorate over time? Twenty-five
years ago, the only glass aircraft in production was the Boeing 767/757. At that
time, pilots were required to do a majority of instrument flying by reference to raw
data instrumentation. Today, however, a majority of US airlines fly highly
automated glass aircraft. The tedious work of flying the aircraft solely by
reference to raw data is becoming a thing of the past. It was the purpose of this
study to determine if pilots are losing their basic instrument flying skills. In this
chapter, the study population, sample, and design are discussed in detail.
Population
The population for this study was professional pilots of FAR 121
commercial carriers. More specifically, the study focused on pilots of major
and/or global (in terms of revenue) US airlines. The aircraft that these pilots
operate are termed transport category by the FAA. Furthermore, the study
focused on the pilots of scheduled passenger airlines.
Sample
The study used data from airline pilots employed by US carriers during
their recurrent training cycle. Each subject flew all five of the basic maneuvers.
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Thirty pilots participated in the study. All of the subjects were active pilots
employed by a major US air carrier (the carriers are not identified). Each pilot
was either a Captain or First Officer and had flown their particular aircraft for at
least one year. The average experience level was 7.1 years with a range from
2-16 years. There were 17 Captains and 13 First Officers, in addition, there were
18 narrow-body and 12 wide-body pilots. Pilots were also separated by the type
of aircraft that they were assigned to, either wide-body (B747, B777, DC-10) or
narrow-body (B737, A320, MD-80). The pilots were separated in order to
determine if there were any statistical differences between these groups.
Study Design
This study utilized a mixed methodology study focusing on two aspects of
basic instrument flying. First a qualitative survey was given to pilots to gauge
their perception of their own instrument skills. The second part of the study
required the use of first look data (data gained from pilot flying a maneuver
without any warning or pre-briefing) from participating airlines and was
quantitative in nature. The quantitative portion of the study was a quasiexperimental design with no formal control group. The first look data was
obtained from a maneuver set comprised of: a takeoff, ILS approach, holding,
missed approach, and an engine failure at V1. These maneuvers were flown
without the use of auto-throttles, a flight director, or the FMC/map. They were
flown solely be reference to raw data (heading, airspeed, attitude, and vertical
speed instruments only). The first maneuver flown first was based on the day of
the week.
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Data Collection Methods/Procedures
Data collection for this study was focused on two parts. The qualitative
portion was completed via survey, and the quantitative portion was done by a
check pilot. The survey consisted of 13 multiple choice questions regarding the
individual pilot’s perception of their own instrument skills. Questions focused on
how much basic instrument flying a pilot does on a regular basis, any flying
outside of their professional employment, and their assessment of their
instrument skills overall that specifically related to raw data flying. The only
identification on this survey for was the aircraft, date, and seat position.
For the maneuvers, the study used the airline’s check pilots who certify
maneuvers for the FAA during recurrent training. The check pilots (check
airmen) rated each maneuver based upon the observed performance of the pilot.
The rating scale was as follows:
Table 1. Grading Scale
Five Point
Grade Scale

5

The pilot remained well within airline standards and
performance was exemplary.

4

The pilot remained within airline standards. Pilot flew to ATP
instrument standards

3

The pilot committed minor deviations from airline standards
that were promptly corrected. Basic instrument level.

2

Major deviations (full scale deflection) for greater than 10
seconds

1

The pilot committed major deviations from airline standards
that were not promptly corrected and/or were unsafe; or was
unable to perform the maneuver/task without assistance.
Crash or loss of aircraft control.

On the data collection form, the aircraft type, date, and seat position was
recorded only in order to match the pilot groups’ objective performance with their
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subjective survey. In addition, a question asked how much experience the pilots
had flying in their particular aircraft (at least one year to be included in the study).
Instrument Reliability and Validity
In order to ensure the success and content validity of the survey, it was
evaluated by a panel of five experts to include; industry, union, and associated
collegiate experts. The experts reviewed the survey for both content and
structure.
The instrument for the maneuvers rating was a certified check airman.
These pilots are certified by the FAA to evaluate maneuvers during recurrent
training. They must attain a certain level of knowledge and experience before
the FAA certifies them. In addition, these pilots must pass a practical exam
administered by the FAA in order to be certified to examine maneuvers. In order
to gain an accurate maneuver rating, each check airman completed a rater
reliability training (RRT). The check airman completed this requirement by
reviewing a detailed instruction sheet on how the maneuvers were to be scored,
examples of valid ratings, and examples of both correct and incorrect scoring. In
addition a specific maneuver deviation sheet was included in each
survey/maneuvers packet to further aid the check airman in scoring the
maneuver.
Proposed Data Analysis
The survey portion of the study attempted to correlate the pilot’s
perceptions and attitudes towards their actual performance (in the pilot groups
and not as individuals).
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The maneuver scores were recorded and set in tables according to what
group the pilot fell into. A descriptive analysis using SPSS was conducted on the
maneuver data. In addition a series of independent t-tests were conducted
comparing the two pilot groups for each maneuver. The alpha level for the entire
study was .05.
Protection of Human Subjects
Pilots who participated in this study did so at no jeopardy to themselves in
regards to their employment status at their respective airline. Participation in the
study did not count towards successfully completing the required recurrent
training program.. The research study received assurances in writing from the
respective airline before the study began and made this point clear to the pilots
before the maneuvers were flown via a written consent form. In addition, the
participating airline gave its consent to be part of the study. The pilot’s union was
also notified of the study before data collection began. Pilots’ survey responses
and actual performance on the maneuvers was completely de-identified to
protect both the pilots and their respective company. When the data material
was received, it was also completely stripped of the company identification. This
was done to prevent the results from any one company being compared to any
other company or ending up published in the media.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
This study consisted of two parts a qualitative survey and a quantative
analysis of basic instrument maneuvers flown in the simulator. Maneuvers were
graded against a set standard and compared to the FAA standard for Airline
Transport Pilots. The survey was conducted in order to gain a perspective into
both how pilots at major airlines fly their aircraft during normal operations, and
how they perceive their own flying skills.
The quantative analysis of the study involved observing pilots flying five
basic instrument maneuvers in an FAA certified level D simulator. The five
maneuvers consisted of flying a takeoff, holding, ILS approach, missed
approach, and a V1 cut. The order of the maneuvers flown was based on the
day of the week. The maneuvers were rated by an FAA certified check airman
and were graded 1-5 based on both a major airline’s and FAA standards.
The type of aircraft the pilots flew was used in comparing both survey
responses and maneuver performance. This comparison was done due to the
fact that these two pilot groups fly similar hours per month, but have vastly
different frequencies (number of takeoffs and landings). During a typical 20 hour
trip a narrow body pilot may have as many as 12-15 takeoffs and landings,
whereas a wide-body pilot would typically have only two. Due to a higher
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frequency of cycles, narrow-body pilots would perform better on the maneuvers
than the wide-body pilots.
The certification standard for all airline pilots is defined by the FAA in “ATP
Practical Test Standards”. Airline standards are generally in line but never less
than the FAA standards. The airline usually adds elements of time for deviations.
When pilots are certified they must attain a standard of four as defined by Table
1 above (page 23).
Experience
The first tests that were performed were a series of independent samples
t-tests that compared self-reported experience with glass and non-glass aircraft
along with the time since flying a non-glass aircraft as a function of type of
aircraft flown. Therefore, as previous stated, pilots were divided into either
narrow-body or wide-body pilots. The results of the t-tests are summarized in the
table below.
Table 2. Experience Independent Samples t-test Results
Type of aircraft

N

Mean

Std.

t

Deviation
Years since flying a non-

Narrow-body

glass aircraft

1

3.50

.857

3.42

.515

2.33

1.328

1.92

1.084

3.89

.323

3.42

.669

Sig. –(2
tailed)

.301

.765

.903

.374

2.591

.015

8
Wide-body

1
2

Years flying a non-glass

Narrow-body

aircraft

1
8

Wide-body

1
2

Years flying a glass aircraft

Narrow-body

1
8

Wide-body

1
2
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The analysis revealed no significant difference in the years since flying a
non-glass aircraft or in the years of experience flying a non-glass aircraft
between narrow body and wide body pilots. However, the analysis indicated that
Narrow-Body Pilots reported flying glass aircraft significantly longer than wide
body pilots.

These results were further analyzed by the specific survey

responses relating to pilot experience. In the case of years since pilots had flown
a non-glass aircraft there were very few pilots with recent experience. A further
examination of the survey question pertaining to experience with glass and nonglass aircraft is presented below.
The first experience survey question asked the pilot how long it had been
since they had flown a non-glass aircraft. The results are presented in figure 1.

Figure 1. Years Since Flying a Non-glass Aircraft
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A majority of these types of aircraft are being retired, and as a result, the
survey indicated that over 56% of the pilots had either never flown a non-glass
aircraft or it had been greater than 10 years since they had done so. The next
category 5-10 years held 36 % of the pilots with 3% each for less than two years
and 2-5 years.
The next survey question sought to quantify how much experience pilots
had flying non-glass aircraft in airline operations. The results are presented in
figure 2. The scale was the same as for the first question. The highest
percentage of pilots (46%) indicated that they had two years or less flying nonglass aircraft. Pilots with 5-10 years experience were 23% of the sample, with
20% having more than 10 years.

Figure 2. Non-glass Experience
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Pilots were then asked how may years they have been flying glass
aircraft. In this question, 73% of the pilots indicated that have 10 or more years
flying these types of aircraft. The next highest response was 5-10 years which
accounted for 23% of the responses. There were no pilots in the survey that
indicated that they had two years or less flying glass aircraft.

Figure 3. Experience Flying Glass Aircraft
Self Assessment
The next section of the survey asked the pilots to asses their basic
instrument skills. Self assessment of flying skills as a function of aircraft type
flown was also analyzed using a series independent samples t-tests. The results
are summarized in the table below.
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Table 3. Self Assessment Independent Samples t-test Results
Type of aircraft

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

t

Sig. (2tailed)

Hand flying below 10,000

Narrow-body

18

1.28

.575

Wide-body

12

1.17

.389

Narrow-body

18

1.56

.511

Wide-body

12

1.33

.492

Skills have declined over

Narrow-body

18

2.06

.873

time

Wide-body

12

1.83

.577

Comfort flying raw rata

Narrow-body

18

2.11

.676

Wide-body

12

2.17

.577

Narrow-body

18

1.89

.758

Wide-body

12

1.83

.718

Company encourages hand

Narrow-body

18

2.00

.767

flying

Wide-body

12

2.25

.866

.585

.563

1.183

.247

.774

.445

-.233

.817

.201

.842

-.831

.413

feet
Ability to fly maneuvers

Often practice raw data skills

This test again revealed no significant difference between narrow body
and wide body pilots in how they assessed their flying skill.
A further presentation of the survey results in graphic form is below.
Survey questions were presented in the form of a statement to which the pilot
responded in terms of; strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, and
strongly disagree. The first statement was “I usually hand fly the aircraft below
10,000 feet.” This statement was used in order to gain a perspective of how
many pilots were actively flying the aircraft. A great majority of aircraft
maneuvering for both takeoff and landing occur below 10,000 feet. Above this
altitude most of the flying is in the cruise phase of flight with little maneuvering.
As such, a pilot will retain a maximum amount of skill by routinely hand flying
below this altitude. The survey responses (Figure 4) indicated that 80% of the
pilots strongly agreed that they usually hand flew the airplane below 10,000 feet.
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In addition 16% of pilots somewhat agreed with the statement. This indicates
that a majority of pilots are hand flying the airplane in the maneuver intensive
phases of flight. It does not however indicate if they are using all of the aircraft’s
advanced capabilities or flying by “raw data”.

Figure 4. Hand Flying
The next statement asked pilots if they felt confident flying by raw data
alone. The results presented in Figure 5 indicated that pilots strongly agreed
with this statement only 13% of the time with 60% stating that they somewhat
agreed. A total of 26% of the pilots somewhat disagreed with the statement.
These responses indicate that a majority of pilots (86%) have some reservations
about flying solely by raw data as indicated by the lack of “strongly agree”
responses.
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Figure 5. Raw Data
In response to the statement “I could fly a takeoff, V1 cut, ILS, and a
missed approach using only raw data,” 53% of pilots strongly agreed and 47%
somewhat agreed (see figure 6).

Figure 6. Ability to Fly Maneuvers
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This indicates that the pilots believed that they could fly these maneuvers
although not perfectly as indicated by the somewhat agree response. There
were no pilots who disagreed with the statement.
Pilots were asked if they believe that their basic instrument skills have
declined over time and the results are presented in figure 7. Pilots agreed with
this statement 26% of the time and somewhat agreed 53% of the time. Only one
pilot strongly disagreed with the statement, however 16% of the pilots somewhat
disagreed with the statement. This indicates that a majority of the pilots feel that
their skills have somewhat diminished over time.

Figure 7. Skills Over Time
Pilots were asked if they often practice their basic instrument skills. The
results are presented in figure 8. Of the pilots surveyed 33% strongly agreed and
46% somewhat agreed. Pilots somewhat disagreed with the statement 20% of
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the time. This statement indicates that a majority of pilots are doing at least
some basic instrument flying.

Figure 8. Skills Practice
The final survey statement asked whether pilots believed that their
company encourages hand flying. This statement saw a wide range of opinions
and the results are presented in figure 9. It is the author’s experience and and
anecdotal opinion that companies who encourage hand flying generally have
pilots who choose to hand fly more often. Pilots agreed with this statement 20%
of the time and somewhat agreed 57% of the time. Pilots somewhat disagreed
16% of the time and strongly disagreed 7% of the time.
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Figure 9. Company Policy
An independent t-test was also performed on the maneuver rating as a
function of aircraft type flown. This was done to determine if any significant
differences were noted between the two different pilot groups. The results are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Mean Maneuver Ratings
Type of aircraft

N

Mean

Std.

t

Deviation
Takeoff Maneuver

V1 Cut Maneuver

Holding Maneuver

Narrow-body

18

3.2222

.94281

Wide-body

12

3.1667

.93744

Narrow-body

18

3.0556

.72536

Wide-body

12

3.0000

.73855

Narrow-body

18

2.4444

.85559

Wide-body

12

2.2500

.86603
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Sig. (2tailed)

.158

.875

.204

.840

.607

.549

Table 4. Continued
ILS Maneuver

Missed Approach

Mean of Maneuvers

Narrow-body

18

3.0556

.80237

Wide-body

12

2.8333

.83485

Narrow-body

18

3.1667

.70711

Wide-body

12

2.9167

.28868

Narrow-body

18

2.9889

.46259

Wide-body

12

2.8333

.46580

.731

.471

1.157

.257

.900

.376

The analysis of the above data revealed no significant differences between widebody and narrow body pilots in their performance on the individual maneuvers or
on a composite measure.
A final set of analyses were computed to test whether the maneuver
ratings (ignoring aircraft type) were significantly different from the FAA standard
of 4. The results are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Maneuver Means
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Takeoff Maneuver

30

3.2000

.92476

.16884

V1 Cut Maneuver

30

3.0333

.71840

.13116

Holding Maneuver

30

2.3667

.85029

.15524

ILD Maneuver

30

2.9667

.80872

.14765

Missed Approach

30

3.0667

.58329

.10649

A t-test reveled that the pilots in the study flew the five basic instrument
maneuvers well below the FAA standards. Significant t scores were noted for all
maneuvers. The t-test results are in Table 6.
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Table 6. One-Sample Test
Test Value = 4 (FAA Standard)
t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference

Lower

Upper

Takeoff Maneuver

-4.738

29

.000

-.80000

-1.1453

-.4547

V1 Cut Maneuver

-7.370

29

.000

-.96667

-1.2349

-.6984

-

29

.000

-1.63333

-1.9508

-1.3158

Holding Maneuver

10.521
ILS Maneuver

-6.998

29

.000

-1.03333

-1.3353

-.7314

Missed Approach

-8.764

29

.000

-.93333

-1.1511

-.7155

The results indicate that the study pilots flew the maneuvers closer to a
basic instrument level instead of the FAA standard for Airline Transport Pilots
(ATP). The holding maneuver received the lowest grade 2.4 and the takeoff had
the highest at 3.2. Takeoffs are largely performed by reference to raw data
instrumentation whereas holding is rarely if ever performed in such a manner.
Correlations
The responses to the survey were correlated with the maneuver ratings
using a bivariate Pearson correlation with a significant correlation at .05 (2tailed). All of the individual maneuvers means were analyzed in addition to the
mean of all of the maneuvers. The mean of all maneuvers should be the most
stable of the analyzed means. The only significant correlation existed between
the holding maneuver and the survey question pertaining to company policy
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regarding hand flying. No other correlations existed. The results are
summarized in Table 7.

Table 7. Correlations
Takeoff

Type of
aircraft

Pearson Correlation

Holding

ILS

Missed

Mean

-.030

-.039

-.114

-.137

-.214

-.168

.875

.840

.549

.471

.257

.376

30

30

30

30

30

30

Pearson Correlation

.163

.101

-.285

-.148

.086

-.038

Sig. (2-tailed)

.388

.596

.127

.435

.650

.841

30

30

30

30

30

30

.000

.227

.367

*

.317

-.016

.312

1.000

.228

.046

.088

.933

.093

30

30

30

30

30

30

-.084

.206

-.053

.135

.066

.075

.660

.274

.781

.475

.728

.693

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Years since
flying a
non-glass
aircraft
Years flying
a non-glass
aircraft

V1 Cut

N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Years flying
a glass
aircraft

Pearson Correlation

30

30

30

30

30

30

Hand flying
below
10,000 feet

Pearson Correlation

.118

.073

-.046

.274

.297

.224

Sig. (2-tailed)

.533

.701

.811

.144

.111

.234

Ability to fly
maneuvers

Pearson Correlation

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

N
Sig. (2-tailed)

30

30

30

30

30

30

-.353

.145

-.011

.123

.124

-.025

.056

.444

.955

.516

.513

.894

30

30

30

30

30

30

N
Skills have
declined
over time

Pearson Correlation

.010

.065

.125

.333

.160

.227

Sig. (2-tailed)

.959

.734

.509

.073

.399

.228

30

30

30

30

30

30

Comfort
flying raw
rata

Pearson Correlation

.071

.142

-.095

.280

-.025

.130

Sig. (2-tailed)

.709

.453

.619

.134

.895

.495

Often
practice
raw data
skills
Company
encourages
hand flying

Pearson Correlation

N

N
Sig. (2-tailed)

30

30

30

30

30

30

-.010

.009

-.141

-.008

.103

-.030

.957

.963

.458

.967

.590

.875

30

30

30

30

30

30

*

N
Pearson Correlation

.251

.114

.399

-.048

.059

.281

Sig. (2-tailed)

.181

.550

.029

.802

.757

.133

30

30

30

30

30

30

N

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed).
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Data Summary
Analysis of the above data strongly suggests that pilots of advanced glass
aircraft have experienced a significant decline in their basic instrument skills. All
of the maneuvers that were sampled were graded below the FAA certification
standard for an Airline Transport Pilot. In addition, the survey indicates that
pilots are aware that their skills have declines, but still believe that they could
successfully fly these maneuvers. Lack of recent basic instrument flying
experience is very high in flying glass aircraft which has lead to the decline in raw
data skills. Further discussion of these findings will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Findings
The study found that professional pilots have a significant decline in their
basic instrument skills. The mean for each maneuver was compared to the FAA
certification standards for both the Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate and the
Instrument rating. An ATP certificate is required to be a Captain for a major
airline. The certification standards are defined in the FAA’s Practical Test
Standards. All of the maneuvers were graded below the FAA certification
standard for an ATP certificate (4) and in fact a majority of the maneuvers were
rated at or below what is required for basic instrument certification (3). The
lowest rated maneuver was holding that was graded at 2.4. This is well below
the basic instrument certification grade (3). The highest rated maneuver was the
takeoff, graded at 3.2. There were two maneuvers graded below three and three
maneuvers graded above three.
The study also found through survey responses that the pilots who
volunteered had an average of over seven years of experience flying their
particular aircraft. In addition, the study found that 73% of the pilots have over
10 years of experience flying newer-generation glass aircraft.
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The majority of

pilots, 47%, had two years or less flying a non-glass aircraft in commercial
service.
The survey also found that 80% of the pilots surveyed agreed that their
basic instrument skills have declined over time. However, when asked if they
could fly the basic instrument maneuvers with reference to raw data only, 100%
of the pilots surveyed stated that they could. In addition, 60% of the pilots
agreed with the statement that they feel comfortable flying by reference to raw
data only. Pilots (80%) also indicated that they often practice their raw data
skills.
Narrow-body and wide-body pilots were examined to see if there was any
significance between maneuver means for these two groups. There was no
statistical difference between these two groups for the basic instrument
maneuvers.
Significance
The data clearly indicates that professional pilots have seen their basic
instrument skills decline over time. The study recognizes, however, that these
same pilots are highly competent in the aircraft that they fly. All of the pilots in
the study continually meet the FAA certification standards for an ATP. The study
only observes one segment of instrument flying and thus only comments on this
segment. The study makes no assessment of professional pilots overall flying
skills, which data suggests are at a very high level.
Certain technical failures in advanced glass aircraft can significantly
degrade cockpit instrumentation. These failures have occurred at the major
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airline that participated in this study. When these failures occur, pilots are
required to use their basic instrument skills to safely land the airplane.
Pilots who are competent in basic instrument flying enhance their overall
flying skills. They can devote less attention to physically flying the airplane and
more time managing their environment.
Although most pilots in the study agreed that their instrument skills have
declined over time, their survey responses indicated that they felt they could still
fly the basic instrument maneuvers. The survey responses related to skills do
not correlate with the actual maneuver grades. This leads to the conclusion that
pilots in the study believed that they could fly the maneuvers better than they
actually could, leading to a false sense of confidence.
Correlation
The maneuver grades generally fit with what the literature review revealed
in other related studies. Earlier studies indicated that skills, when not used,
decline over time. This was observed throughout the study in the mean
maneuver grades. Earlier studies also suggest that pilots who fly advanced
glass aircraft see a general decline in their basic instrument skills as a result of
using the instrumentation features of these aircraft.
Survey responses, although candid about skills declining over time, did
not correlate with maneuver grades or responses to earlier surveys on the same
subject. It would seem as though the pilots who participated in the study
believed that their skills had not declined as much as indicated by the maneuver
grades.
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The suggestion by earlier studies that once a skill set was learned and
practiced over a long period of time it would be retained longer than if the skills
were practiced over a shorter period of time. This was not seen in the wide-body
/ narrow-body within groups comparison. Pilots of the wide-body aircraft had
more experience flying older-generation aircraft than the narrow-body pilots, but
had very similar maneuver grades. In fact there was no statistical difference
between maneuver grades for these two groups. This is most likely due to the
fact that although narrow-body pilots fly similar monthly hours, they fly far more
cycles than wide-body pilots. This leads in a significant increase in maneuvering
the aircraft and thus increased flying skills.
Weaknesses
This study only observed five maneuvers. The maneuvers were selected
due to both their complexity and their relevance to typical line flying. These
maneuvers are trained and practiced by every pilot at least every nine months at
the major airline that participated in the study. Although these maneuvers are
very common, they represent only a very small portion of the total flight
maneuver envelope.
The study involved pilots at a major US airline. This particular airline
retired all of it’s non-glass aircraft in the fall of 2001. As a result, most of the
pilots in the study had not flown an older generation aircraft in the past 5-10
years. Other major US airlines still operate these types of aircraft although they
too are in the process of removing them from active service. The results might
have been different if pilots from these other carriers were included in the study.
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Legal barriers kept these other airlines from participating. Since most major
carriers are retiring older generation aircraft, the results that were seen in this
study would likely apply to these other carrier at a later date due to their pilots
becoming less familiar with basic instrument flying. Although including pilots who
are currently flying older generation aircraft would make a slightly better within
groups analysis possible, it would be valid for this point in time only. In the next
five years, all major carriers will be flying newer generation aircraft hence these
results would be valid for most other major airline in the future. Since only one
major airline participated in the study, the corporate culture, policies, procedures,
and training program curriculum could have affected the results of the study. The
airline that participated has an advanced qualification program (AQP) for both
initial and recurrently training cycles. This training philosophy is targeted for crew
training. Pilots train and check together throughout all phases of training.
Training consists of critiquing both how the pilots physically flew the aircraft and
how they interacted with each other. In this type of training program less time is
spent on flying maneuvers than a traditional training program. It must be noted
however, that the certification standards are identical for both programs.
Traditional training programs focus on flying specific maneuver sets with little or
no input from the other pilot.
The survey attempted to garner both the pilots’ experience and the way
that they flew their aircraft and generally had four responses to the questions. In
addition, the survey consisted of a total of 13 questions. The responses in the
survey pertaining to pilots’ assessment of their own skills did not correlate with
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their actual performance. If the survey were somewhat more robust with regards
to response choices, a better picture of the pilots’ self assessment may have
been able to be gained. In addition, only three pilots indicated that they flew
outside of their current professional employment. As a result, very little was
inferred from how these pilots were rated on the actual maneuvers.
Future
There is little doubt that based on the results of the maneuvers,
professional pilot’s basic instrument skills have declined over time. This is linked
to non-use of these skills in routine line flying. In addition, newer-generation
aircraft generally do not lend themselves to basic instrument flying, nor do most
companies train or promote this type of flying. Although it is rare, some failures
in advanced glass aircraft can degrade the aircraft instrumentation to a state that
would require a pilot to fly the aircraft based on raw data alone. During the past
10 years, two such failures have occurred at the airline that participated in the
study. In both cases the pilots landed safely.
The key to retaining these skills is practice. Each professional pilot was
highly competent in these skills at one time during their career. A follow on study
to determine how much practice is needed to retain these skills would be
required. In addition each airline would have to not only train and practice these
skills, but encourage their use while line flying.
The results of this study will be forwarded to the airline that participated as
well as the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) in hopes that airlines will realize that
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basic instrument skills have declined in their pilots but also stress the need for
training and practicing these maneuvers.
Airline safety can be improved by having pilots that are competent not only
in flying the airplane with all of the advanced instrumentation working, but with
degraded systems as well. Pilots possessed these basic instrument skills at one
time. These skills can be increased through both training and practice thus
making the pilot better to handle problems that degrade aircraft instrumentation.
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APPENDIX B
Definitions
.AC Advisory circular
ACO Aircraft certification office
AD Airworthiness directive
AEG Aircraft Evaluation Group
ALPA Airline Pilots Association
APA Allied Pilots Association
AQP Advanced Qualification Program
ARAC Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
ASAP Aviation Safety/Accident Prevention
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System
ATA Air Transport Association of America
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATP: Airline Transport Pilot
ATS Air Traffic Services
AWO All weather operations
BIS Basic Instrument Skills: The ability to fly the aircraft solely by reference to
the raw data without the use of auto-throttles, flight director, or map mode.
CFIT Controlled flight into terrain
CMO Certificate Management Office
CNS Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance
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CRM Crew resource management
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FCOM Flightcrew operating manual
FCU Flight control unit
FMS Flight management system
FOEB Flight Operations Evaluation Board
FSB Flight Standardization Board
FSDO Flight Standards District Office
GPS Global Positioning System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
HF Human factors
HFStG Human factors steering group (JAA)
HWG Harmonization working group
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IOE Initial Operational Experience
ILS Instrument Landing System
JAA Joint Aviation Authorities
JAR Joint Aviation Requirements
LNAV Lateral navigation
LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training
LOS Line Operational Simulations
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Modern Aircraft/Glass Aircraft: Aircraft that have advanced automation to
include: CAT III capability, auto-throttles, flight director, FMC, and CRT displays
instead of actual instruments, the ability to LNAV and VNAV
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
Old Style Aircraft: Aircraft that have standard cockpit instrumentation to include
an attitude indicator and HIS. These aircraft may have Lnav and CAT III
capability but they do not have any CRT displays
PDC Pre-departure clearance
PFD Primary flight display
PTS: Practical Test Standards defined by the FAA pilot qualification.
RNP Required Navigation Performance
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
STC Supplemental type certificate
TAD Transport Airplane Directorate
TC Type certificate
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
VNAV Vertical navigation
VOR Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Radio Range
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